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Abstract: 
Managers have great discretion in determining management forecast characteristics, but little is 
known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. In this paper, we examine 
whether managers strategically choose the precision of their earnings forecasts for self-serving 
purposes. Building on prior research demonstrating that the market reaction to vague 
management forecasts is weaker than its reaction to precise forecasts, we find that for 
management forecasts disclosed before insider sales, more positive (negative) news forecasts are 
more (less) precise than other management forecasts. The opposite applies to management 
forecasts disclosed before insider purchases. These results are consistent with managers 
strategically choosing the precision of their earnings forecasts to increase stock prices before 
insider sales and to decrease stock prices before insider purchases. Additional analyses indicate 
that the impact of managerial incentives on forecast precision is less pronounced when 
institutional ownership is high or when disclosure risk is high, and is more pronounced when it is 
difficult for investors to assess the precision of managers’ information. 
 
Keywords: Management Forecast; Managerial Incentives; Insider Trading; Forecast Precision 
 
                                                        
 We thank Jeffrey Callen, Xia Chen, Zhaoyang Gu, Bin Ke, Kevin Koh, Yue Li, Charles Shi, Hun Tong Tan, Yuan Xie, Huai 
Zhang, and workshop participants at the 2012 FARS conference, Nanyang Technological University, National University of 
Singapore, and Shanghai University of Finance and Economics for helpful comments. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2202064
 
1 
1. Introduction 
Issuing earnings forecasts is an important channel that managers use to convey information 
to investors. Unlike mandatory disclosures such as annual reports, management forecasts are 
voluntary, and managers have considerable discretion on whether and how to provide earnings 
forecasts. Motivated by the usefulness of management forecasts, prior research has examined 
extensively what determines their frequency (e.g., Skinner 1994, 1997; Lang and Lundholm 
2000; Cheng and Lo 2006). Yet despite the considerable discretion that managers have in issuing 
the forecasts and the importance of such characteristics as forecast precision and horizon to 
market reactions, it is not well understood how managers’ incentives affect these characteristics 
(Hirst et al. 2008).  
In this paper, we focus on one important characteristic of management forecasts – forecast 
precision – and examine how managerial incentives affect the choice of forecast precision. We 
choose to focus on forecast precision (or specificity, as it is sometimes referred to in the 
literature) for two reasons. First, precision is one of the most important forecast characteristics 
over which managers have a great deal of discretion. Managers can issue qualitative or 
quantitative forecasts, and the latter may take the form of point forecasts, range forecasts, or 
open-ended forecasts. More than 80% of the quantitative forecasts compiled by Thomas 
Financial are in the range format (i.e., estimates with explicit upper and lower bounds), and there 
is a large degree of variation in forecast width (i.e., the difference between the upper and lower 
bounds). One might even argue that managers have greater discretion over the precision of their 
earnings forecasts than over whether to provide forecasts in the first place (Hirst et al. 2008). 
Managers cannot always withhold information because it is part of their fiduciary duty to update 
and correct previous disclosures. Furthermore, withholding information can lead to considerable 
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litigation risks and can cause great damage to a manager’s reputation (Skinner 1994).  
Second, forecast precision has a significant effect on market reactions to management 
forecasts. A number of theoretical papers, such as Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Subramanyam 
(1996), argue that the magnitude of the market reaction to a disclosure is positively related to its 
precision, and empirical studies examining the impact of management forecast precision on stock 
returns and analyst forecast revisions provide support for this argument (e.g., Baginski et al. 
1993; Baginski et al. 2007).  
Building on prior research, we identify the most frequently investigated managerial 
incentive in the voluntary disclosure literature, insider trading, and examine whether it provides 
managers with incentives to choose forecast precision strategically. Given that the precision of 
management forecasts has a significant effect on stock prices – more precise forecasts have a 
larger impact on stock prices than vague forecasts – we argue that trading incentives affect 
forecast precision and that the effect depends on both the sign and magnitude of the news. As 
managers prefer a higher stock price prior to insider sales, we predict that good news disclosed 
before insider sales is more precise, and that the more positive the news is, the more precise the 
forecast is.1 Similarly, we hypothesize that bad news disclosed before insider sales is less 
precise, and that the more negative the news is, the more vague the forecast. In other words, we 
predict a positive association between forecast news and the precision for management forecasts 
issued before insider sales. Given that prior research finds that there is, on average, a positive 
association between forecast news and precision (e.g., Skinner 1994; Choi et al. 2010), these 
arguments imply that the association is more positive for management forecasts issued before 
insider sales than for those not followed by insider trading. In contrast, as managers benefit from 
                                                        
1 In line with prior research, we calculate forecast news as the difference between the mid-point estimate of management forecast 
of earnings per share (EPS) and the consensus analyst forecast, scaled by the pre-release share price. 
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a lower stock price before insider purchases, we predict the opposite for management forecasts 
disclosed before insider purchases, i.e., a less positive association between forecast news and the 
precision for management forecasts issued before insider purchases than for those not followed 
by insider trading. 
To test our hypotheses, we examine a sample of 10,799 management earnings forecasts 
issued in the 1999-2006 period. We use the negative of forecast width (the magnitude of the 
range for range forecasts and zero for point forecasts) to measure forecast precision. To test our 
predictions, we regress forecast precision on forecast news, trading incentives (indicators for 
insider sales or purchases), and their interactions. We also control for other determinants of 
forecast precision, such as managers’ information uncertainty, market demand for information, 
the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure, equity issuance, and the precision of past management 
forecasts.   
Consistent with prior research, we find an overall positive association between forecast 
news and forecast precision; the more positive the news is, the more precise the forecast is. More 
importantly, we find that, consistent with our hypotheses, trading incentives systematically affect 
the association between forecast news and precision. We find that forecast precision is more 
positively correlated with forecast news for management forecasts issued before insider sales 
than for other management forecasts. For those issued before insider purchases, we find a less 
positive correlation between forecast news and precision. To highlight the notion that the 
direction of insider trading’s effect on forecast precision depends on the sign of the news, in an 
additional analysis we replace the continuous forecast news variable with indicators for the sign 
of the news. We find that compared with management forecasts issued at other times, good news 
issued before insider sales is more precise and bad news before insider sales is less precise, 
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whereas good news issued before insider purchases is less precise and bad news before insider 
purchases is more precise. Overall, these results indicate that managers choose to issue forecasts 
in a form that increases these forecasts’ impact if that impact is desirable and reduces it if it is 
undesirable.  
To obtain further support for our main inferences and to provide additional insights, we 
also examine three conditioning variables that can affect the relation between managerial 
incentives and forecast precision. First, previous research shows that institutional investors play 
an important monitoring role and demand more transparent disclosure than individual investors 
(e.g., Bushee 1998; Ajinkya et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2007). If this is the case, then managers’ 
strategic behavior is likely to be mitigated by the presence of institutional investors. Consistent 
with this prediction, we find that the effect of trading incentives on the association between 
forecast news and precision is weaker when institutional ownership is high than when it is low. 
Second, while the risk of strategically changing forecasts precision is lower than the risk 
associated with other forms of managerial discretion in the voluntary disclosure domain, such as 
withholding news, it is not risk-free and the extent of the risk varies. We argue that the strategic 
decision on forecast precision is associated with a higher degree of risk for good news forecasts 
issued before insider sales and for bad news forecasts issued before insider purchases, because 
managers have incentives to increase the precision of forecasts in these two scenarios, thus 
leading to a greater likelihood of forecasts being proven wrong (i.e., a greater likelihood of actual 
earnings falling outside the forecast range). In contrast, the strategic decision on forecast 
precision is associated with lower risk for bad news forecasts issued before insider sales and for 
good news forecasts issued before insider purchases, because managers have incentives to 
decrease forecast precision in these two scenarios, thereby leading to a lower likelihood of 
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forecasts being proven incorrect. Hence, we posit that managerial incentives are less likely to 
affect forecast precision in the cases of good news preceding insider sales and bad news 
preceding insider purchases than in the cases of bad news preceding insider sales and good news 
preceding insider purchases. Our results are consistent with this prediction.  
Third, managers’ ability to choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes depends on 
investors’ ability to assess the precision of managers’ information. If investors are able to “see 
through” the precision game and react accordingly, then strategically choosing forecast precision 
will not benefit managers. Thus, we expect that managers are more likely to strategically choose 
forecast precision when investors have greater difficulty in evaluating the precision of their 
information. Using several variables to capture the level of this difficulty, we find results 
consistent with our prediction. 
We also conduct several additional tests to enrich our analyses and to ensure the robustness 
of our results. First, we validate the assumption that precise forecasts are associated with stronger 
market reactions than vague forecasts. Second, we find that our results are not driven by the 
reverse causality (i.e., disclosure precision affecting the existence of insider trading) or 
self-selection in the issuance of management forecasts. Third, we find that our results are robust 
to alternative research design choices, such as using the magnitude of insider trading rather than 
indicators for such trading, and to controlling for the effect of contemporaneous earnings 
announcements for bundled management forecasts. 
Our study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature in several important ways. First, 
Hirst et al. (2008) suggest that forecast characteristics such as forecast precision are the most 
controllable, yet least studied, dimension of management forecasts. Although several studies 
(Baginski and Hassell 1997; Ajinkya et al. 2005) have examined the economic determinants of 
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forecast precision, we extend this line of research by demonstrating the importance of managerial 
incentives in determining forecast precision. We also investigate the conditions under which the 
impact of managerial incentives is weaker or stronger.  
Second, this study extends the corporate disclosure literature by providing evidence that 
managers strategically determine forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Although several 
studies find that managerial incentives affect corporate disclosure in general and management 
forecast practices in particular, their primary focus is on whether managers overstate earnings 
(e.g., Beneish 1999), disclose information (e.g., Cheng and Lo 2006), or bias the information 
they disclose (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 2005). Our study complements these studies by focusing 
on managers’ discretion in choosing the precision of their forecasts.  
This study builds upon and extends Rogers (2008). Rogers argues that when deciding the 
quality of disclosure in response to insider trading incentives, managers face a tradeoff between 
maintaining their information advantage and reducing litigation risk. He finds that managers tend 
to issue forecasts with high disclosure quality before insider sales to reduce litigation risk, but to 
issue forecasts with low disclosure quality before insider purchases to maintain their information 
advantage. There are two key differences between our study and Rogers (2008). First, we argue 
that managers’ disclosure decisions are a joint function of insider trading incentives and the 
nature of the news disclosed. It is in managers’ best interests to increase (decrease) the quality of 
the disclosure when the market reaction to that disclosure is favorable (unfavorable) to them. Our 
empirical analyses confirm that the quality of management forecasts disclosed before insider 
sales (purchases) varies with forecast news, and it is not uniformly better (worse). For example, 
for management forecasts issued before insider sales, managers prefer to issue more precise 
forecasts for more positive news but less precise forecasts for more negative news. While the 
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former can be regarded as of high quality, the latter can be regarded as of low quality. Second, 
Rogers (2008) uses the change in liquidity around disclosures as a measure of disclosure quality. 
In contrast, we examine an observable action taken by managers and are thus able to provide 
more contextual evidence. The drawback of our approach is that forecast precision is only one 
aspect of managers’ disclosure decisions. In sum, taken together the two studies provide a more 
complete picture of the managerial decision-making process in the choice of voluntary disclosure 
quality.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature 
on management forecasts and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and research 
design. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 presents additional analyses, and 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Related prior research  
Managers have an information advantage over outside investors, and they rely on both 
mandatory reporting and voluntary disclosure to reduce this information asymmetry. 
Management earnings forecast is one of the most common types of voluntary disclosure and 
prior research finds that management forecasts provide important information to the capital 
markets (e.g., Baginski and Hassell 1990; Pownall et al. 1993; Coller and Yohn 1997; Rogers 
and Stocken 2005; Rogers 2008). See Healy and Palepu (2001) and Hirst et al. (2008) for a 
review of this literature.  
Because management forecasts are voluntary, managers have considerable discretion as to 
whether, when, and what to disclose. The extant literature indicates that while managers use 
  8  
voluntary disclosure to reduce information asymmetry, they also exploit their discretion over 
such disclosure for self-serving purposes. For example, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) document 
that managers reduce the exercise price of option grants by disclosing bad news and withholding 
good news prior to option grant dates. Lang and Lundholm (2000) find that firms increase the 
frequency of disclosure and issue more favorable news prior to raising external capital. Cheng 
and Lo (2006) document that managers disclose more bad news before buying stocks on their 
personal accounts. Brockman et al. (2008) find that the frequency and magnitude of bad news 
(good news) disclosures are higher (lower) before share repurchases, presumably to deflate stock 
prices so that firms can buy back shares at a lower price. Overall, the evidence in this area 
indicates that the frequency of management forecasts is affected by managers’ incentives.  
Although managers have opportunities to exploit their discretion over earnings forecasts, 
investors can use subsequent audited earnings reports and information from other sources to 
evaluate the credibility of these forecasts. If managers are thought to have withheld information 
or issued biased forecasts, investors may sue them, and managers’ reputations might be damaged 
(Skinner 1994, 1997). The risk of such litigation is particularly high when insider trading is 
involved. Insider trading is subject to the “disclose or abstain” rule, which requires that insiders 
in possession of material nonpublic information either disclose it to the public before trading or 
abstain from trading. Such litigation risk and ex post discipline greatly restrain managerial 
discretion over whether and what to disclose. Consistent with the notion that managers are 
concerned about litigation risk, Cheng and Lo (2006) find that managers are not more likely to 
withhold bad news or issue good news before insider sales. Consistent with the disciplinary role 
of subsequent earnings reports in reducing management forecast bias, Rogers and Stocken (2005) 
find that managers have incentives to provide biased forecasts only when investors have 
  9  
difficulty in detecting that bias. 
In this study, we take the decision to issue management forecasts as a given and explore 
how managerial incentives affect managers’ decisions regarding forecast precision. Compared to 
withholding information or providing biased forecasts, providing information with desirable 
precision is subject to lower litigation risk. Managers can issue point, range, or qualitative 
estimates, and for range forecasts, they can choose the size of the range. The literature suggests 
that forecast precision affects the market reaction to earnings guidance. For example, Kim and 
Verrecchia (1991) and Subramanyam (1996) show that more precise information leads to a 
larger market reaction. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, Baginski et al. (1993) find that 
point forecasts are associated with a greater market reaction than range forecasts.2 If more 
precise forecasts are associated with stronger market reactions, then managers can strategically 
choose forecast precision to influence the market reaction for self-serving purposes. Indeed, 
Hughes and Pae (2004) show analytically that entrepreneurs who plan to sell shares choose high 
precision for good news to increase stock prices and low precision for bad news to mitigate the 
decline in stock prices.  
In the next section, we discuss how managerial incentives can affect the precision of 
management forecasts. We focus on the incentive that prior research examines most: insider 
trading. 
2.2 Hypothesis development – Insider trading, forecast news, and forecast precision 
When managers trade shares of their companies on their personal accounts, they have 
incentives to increase trading gains by utilizing their information advantage. Penman (1982) and 
                                                        
2 Other studies (e.g., Pownall et al. 1993), however, find an insignificant relation between market response and forecast form. In 
a recent working paper, Baginski et al. (2007) confirm the finding in Baginski et al. (1993). We also confirm these results in this 
study. See Section 5.1 for details. 
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Noe (1999) find that managers sell more shares after good news than after bad news, and buy 
more shares after bad news than after good news, suggesting that managers strategically choose 
the timing of their trading activities to increase insider trading gains. Building on these findings, 
Cheng and Lo (2006) argue that managers may change the frequency of voluntary disclosure 
before insider trading and they find that managers are more likely to disclose bad news before 
buying shares. Using the change in liquidity to proxy for disclosure quality, Rogers (2008) finds 
that managers strategically change disclosure quality in response to personal trading incentives. 
He finds that disclosure quality is on average higher before insider sales and lower before insider 
purchases. Rogers and Stocken (2005) document that when the market has difficulty detecting 
managers’ misreporting, managers are more likely to issue optimistic (pessimistic) earnings 
forecasts before insider sales (purchases). 
However, withholding information or issuing biased forecasts is subject to substantial 
litigation risk (e.g., Skinner 1994; Cheng and Lo 2006). Under the “disclose or abstain” rule, 
managers are obligated to issue forecasts before engaging in insider trading. We argue that given 
the disclosure of news, managers can increase trading gains by manipulating forecast precision to 
influence the market response to the news. Since the benefit of selling shares increases with 
stock prices, we expect that managers are more likely to be vague when issuing negative news 
before insider sales and are more likely to be precise when issuing positive news before insider 
sales. In contrast, managers benefit from a lower stock price when buying shares. Thus, we posit 
that when managers are about to buy stocks, they are more likely to be vague when issuing 
positive news and they are more likely to be precise when issuing negative news.  
Note that we expect both the sign and magnitude of the news to affect the forecast 
precision decision. The sign of the news (good or bad) affects the direction of insider trading’s 
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impact on management forecast precision, whereas the magnitude of the news affects the size of 
that impact. Because news of greater magnitude has a larger impact on stock prices and insider 
trading gains, managers’ incentives to influence forecast precision are expected to be stronger 
when the magnitude of the news is greater. Therefore, we consider how the impact of insider 
trading on forecast precision varies with forecast news. As previous research (e.g., Skinner 1994; 
Choi et al. 2010) finds that on average, better news is more precise than worse news, we expect 
this positive association to be more pronounced for management forecasts issued before insider 
sales and less pronounced for those issued before insider purchases.3 
The above discussion leads to our main hypothesis: 
H1: The association between forecast precision and news is more positive for management 
forecasts issued before insider sales and less positive for those issued before insider 
purchases than it is for other management forecasts.  
 
2.3 Hypothesis Development – Conditioning factors 
Institutional ownership 
By strategically disclosing either vague or precise information before insider trading, 
managers can influence the market reaction to management forecasts in the direction that is 
beneficial to them. Such self-serving behavior comes at the expense of current and/or potential 
shareholders. It thus follows that such behavior is less likely to be tolerated when shareholders 
are able to monitor managers effectively. Prior research documents that institutional investors 
can serve as effective monitors and usually demand more transparent corporate disclosure (e.g., 
Bushee and Noe 2000; Healy and Palepu 2001). Institutional investors often attend conference 
calls and closely follow management earnings forecasts. In addition, they collect firm-specific 
                                                        
3 Prior research attributes the positive association between forecast news and precision to managers’ preference for higher stock 
prices in general, or in other words, to their preference for stronger reactions to good news and weaker reactions to bad news. It is 
because of this general trend that we do not state our hypothesis as the net association between forecast news and precision before 
insider trading.  
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information from various sources on an ongoing basis and strive to reduce their information 
disadvantage. Consistent with these arguments, Bamber and Cheon (1998) find that firms with 
block shareholders issue more precise forecasts, and Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that firms with 
higher institutional ownership are more likely to issue precise earnings forecasts.  
Thus, if institutional investors can effectively monitor managers’ forecast behavior and 
demand more transparent disclosure, then they can restrain managers from engaging in strategic 
behavior in choosing forecast precision. Thus our second hypothesis is as follows: 
 H2: The impact of insider trading incentives on management forecast precision, as 
hypothesized in H1, is less pronounced for firms with high institutional ownership than 
for firms with low institutional ownership. 
 
Disclosure risk 
Although we argue that a strategic decision regarding management forecast precision is 
subject to less risk than withholding news or providing biased forecasts, it is not risk-free, and 
the extent of the risk varies. The risk that is associated with the disclosure of forward-looking 
information, or disclosure risk in short, arises in our setting if the information disclosed is 
subsequently proven to be wrong (Cheng and Lo 2006). As previously discussed, managers have 
incentives to increase the precision of management forecasts when they disclose good news 
before selling shares or when they disclose bad news before buying shares. The more precise the 
forecast is, the more likely it is to be proven wrong (i.e., the actual earnings may fall outside the 
forecast range), thus leading to greater disclosure risk (Choi et al. 2010). In contrast, when 
managers disclose bad news before selling shares or good news before buying shares, they have 
incentives to decrease the precision of their forecasts. Such a strategy is subject to lower 
disclosure risk because forecasts with wider ranges are less likely to be proven wrong (i.e., the 
actual earnings are more likely to fall inside the forecast range). Because managers are less likely 
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to engage in strategic behavior when the litigation risk is high (e.g., Baginski et al. 2002), we 
expect that managers are less likely to act strategically in choosing management forecast 
precision in the high disclosure risk scenario (good news preceding insider sales or bad news 
preceding insider purchases) than in the low risk scenario (bad news preceding insider sales or 
good news preceding insider purchases).4  
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
 H3: The impact of insider trading incentives on management forecast precision, as 
hypothesized in H1, is less pronounced in the high disclosure risk scenario (good news 
preceding insider sales or bad news preceding insider purchases) than in the low risk 
scenario (bad news preceding insider sales or good news preceding insider 
purchases).  
 
Investors’ ability to assess the precision of managers’ information 
Rogers and Stocken (2005) argue that the likelihood of managers providing biased 
forecasts depends on investors’ ability to evaluate the accuracy of their information. In a similar 
vein, we argue that investors’ ability to assess the precision of management’s information is 
important if managers want to strategically choose the forecast precision and guide the market 
for their own benefit. When investors can estimate the precision of managers’ information with a 
fair degree of accuracy, they are doubtful of forecasts that deviate from the expected precision 
level. For example, if investors assume that managers have received a precise signal about future 
earnings, managers cannot use their discretion to blur the forecast. Similarly, if investors believe 
that managers cannot precisely estimate future performance, managers have less discretion in 
choosing forecast precision levels. In contrast, if investors do not know the precision level of the 
information that managers have, managers can strategically choose the forecast precision level. 
Thus our final hypothesis is: 
                                                        
4 Note that the discussion of the variation in disclosure risk underlying H3 is within the setting of strategically choosing forecast 
precision. It has no bearing on other strategic decisions, such as the withholding of information. 
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H4: The impact of insider trading incentives on management forecast precision, as 
hypothesized in H1, is more pronounced if investors have greater difficulty in 
assessing the precision of managers’ information.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Design 
3.1 Sample and data 
We obtain our sample of management forecasts over the 1999-2006 period from the First 
Call Historical Database. We include both quarterly and annual forecasts of earnings per share 
(EPS) for the current quarter or year.5 To focus on voluntary earnings forecasts, we exclude 
pre-announcement forecasts issued after the corresponding fiscal period-end.6 Unlike some 
previous studies (e.g., Cheng and Lo 2006), we cannot use the market reaction to earnings 
forecasts to capture the nature of news because our focus – forecast precision – affects the 
magnitude of market reaction. Instead, we determine the nature of news based on the comparison 
between management forecasts and the prevailing consensus analyst forecasts. Accordingly, we 
exclude qualitative and open-ended forecasts. The foregoing procedure leaves us with an initial 
sample of 41,543 management forecasts.  
From this initial sample, we exclude forecasts for which the other data we require for 
analyses are missing. First, we exclude 15,387 observations for which the data needed to 
calculate regression variables (other than forecast news) are missing from the Compustat, Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), or Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
databases. Second, we exclude 11,616 management forecasts for which there are no 
corresponding analyst forecast data and for which we are thus unable to determine forecast 
                                                        
5 If there are both quarterly and annual forecasts on the same day, we retain only the former because quarterly forecasts, on 
average, have a larger effect on the market than annual forecasts (e.g., Pownall et al. 1993; Baginski et al. 1993). 
6 Earnings forecasts issued during a quarter do not need to be furnished to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
whereas a pre-announcement after the quarter end must be. 
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news.7 Finally, when the consensus analyst forecast for an observation falls within the range of 
the management forecast, we cannot unambiguously classify it as good or bad news. To increase 
the power of our tests, we thus follow Baginski et al. (1993) and exclude 3,741 such observations, 
although including them in the analyses leads to qualitatively similar results. This sample 
selection procedure leaves us with a final sample of 10,799 management earnings forecasts 
issued by 1,991 unique firms.  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the yearly and quarterly distribution of management forecasts. 
The table indicates an overall increase in forecast frequency and/or First Call coverage over the 
sample period, with 267 forecasts issued in 1999 and 2,169 issued in 2006. Management 
forecasts are distributed roughly evenly across the four fiscal quarters, with fewer in the first 
quarter and more in the fourth. In our sample, 2,185 management forecasts (20.23% of the 
sample) are point estimates and 8,614 (79.77%) are range estimates. This untabulated 
distribution highlights the variation in forecast precision. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the frequency of management forecasts by the sign of the 
forecast news. Forecast news is calculated as the difference between the mid-point estimate of 
the management forecast of EPS and the consensus analyst forecast, scaled by the pre-release 
share price. Because we use the average of analyst forecasts and the point estimate or mid-point 
of the range forecast to calculate forecast news, this variable is rarely exactly zero (less than 0.5% 
of the sample). Following prior research (e.g., Clement et al. 2003; Rogers and Van Buskirk 
2011), we treat management forecasts with forecast news of a small magnitude as neutral 
forecasts. More specifically, we classify management forecasts for which the absolute value of 
the forecast news is in the bottom quintile of the sample distribution as neutral news. We classify 
                                                        
7 As an alternative, we also use the random walk model to determine the market expectation for observations without analyst 
forecasts, and doing so leads to qualitatively similar results.  
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other forecasts as good (bad) news forecasts if forecast news is positive (negative). As reported 
in Panel B, 3,555 management forecasts (33% of the sample) are classified as good news, 5,067 
(47%) as bad news, and 2,177 (20%) as neutral news.8 The higher frequency of bad news is 
consistent with the literature starting with Skinner (1994) and suggests that managers are more 
likely to disclose bad news, presumably to reduce litigation risk.  
3.2 Measurement of key variables 
Management forecast range (Width) and forecast precision (Precision). Management 
forecast range (Width) is calculated as the difference between the upper- and lower-end estimates, 
divided by the absolute value of the mid-point forecast, and it is 0 for point forecasts.9 As 
reported in Table 2, the mean (median) of Width is 0.117 (0.053), suggesting that the mean 
(median) range is 11.7% (5.3%) of the mid-point of the forecast. More importantly, there is a 
large variation in forecast width, which ranges from 0 (5th percentile) to 0.462 (95th percentile).  
For ease of interpretation, we use the negative of the forecast range as the dependent 
variable; that is, forecast precision (Precision) is Width times -1. A larger value of Precision 
indicates a more precise management forecast. 
Management forecast news (FN). FN is calculated as the difference between the point or 
the mid-point estimate of the management forecast of EPS and the consensus analyst forecast, 
scaled by the pre-release share price. The consensus analyst forecast is calculated as the average 
of the analyst forecasts issued in the 90 days before the management forecast.10 To be consistent 
with quarterly forecasts, FN is divided by 4 for annual forecasts. Both the mean and median of 
                                                        
8 The proportions of good, bad, and neutral news forecasts are similar to those reported in the prior research (e.g., Lennox and 
Park 2006). Using other criteria to define neutral news, such as the bottom 10%, 15%, 25%, or 30%, leads to quantitatively 
similar results. 
9 We find similar results when we use the pre-forecast stock price as the deflator.  
10 We use the 90-day period to reduce the influence of stale analyst forecasts. Furthermore, if an analyst issues more than one 
earnings forecast in this period, we run a robustness test using only the most recent forecast issued by that analyst, and obtain 
similar results. 
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FN are significantly negative (p < 0.01 based on untabulated tests). 
Insider trading (InsiderSell, InsiderBuy). We obtain insider trading data from Thomson 
Financial. An insider is defined as a person who serves as the CEO, president, or a director. We 
include all open market transactions of a firm’s shares or options. As the volume of insider 
trading is highly skewed, we define two indicator variables, InsiderSell and InsiderBuy, to 
capture the existence of insider trading over the 30-day window after the management forecast. 
InsiderSell equals 1 when the net insider trading is a net sale (i.e., insider sales are higher than 
insider purchases), and 0 otherwise. InsiderBuy equals 1 when the net insider trading is a net 
purchase, and 0 otherwise. Within our sample, 2,831 forecasts (26% of the sample) are followed 
by insider sales, 1,417 (13%) by insider purchases, and the remainder (61%) by no insider 
trading.11 
As prior research finds that managers are more likely to disclose good news before insider 
sales and bad news before insider purchases, it is important to determine whether there are any 
observations in our sample with bad news before insider sales and good news before insider 
purchases. For this purpose, in Panel B of Table 1, we present the distribution of management 
forecasts according to whether they are followed by insider sales or purchases. Of the 
management forecasts issued before insider sales, 41% are good news forecasts and 31% are bad 
news forecasts. Of those issued before insider purchases, 28% are good news forecasts and 52% 
are bad news forecasts. In other words, there are more good news forecasts than bad news 
forecasts before insider sales and more bad news forecasts than good news forecasts before 
insider purchases. This observation is consistent with the findings in previous studies (e.g., 
                                                        
11 Rogers (2008) also finds that there are more management forecasts followed by insider sales than by insider purchases. 
However, the total proportion of management forecasts followed by insider trading is higher in our study than in his, most likely 
for two non-exclusive reasons. First, our sample periods are different. Rogers’s sample period is 1994-2002, whereas ours is 
1999-2006. We find that insider trading activities have increased substantially in recent years. Second, our sample selection 
criteria are different. Unlike Rogers (2008), we require analyst forecast data and exclude qualitative forecasts. 
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Penman 1982; Noe 1999; Cheng and Lo 2006). However, the frequency with which bad news 
appears prior to insider sales and good news prior to insider purchases is not trivial and this is not 
surprising given managers’ fiduciary duty to provide information that updates and corrects 
previous disclosures (Skinner 1994; Cheng and Lo 2006).  
3.3 Empirical Design 
We estimate the following model to examine the effect of insider trading incentives on 
forecast precision (Precision), or more precisely, on the relation between forecast news and 
forecast precision:12 
HEE
EEEE
u
u 
VariablesControlδInsiderBuyFNInsiderBuy
lInsiderSelFNlInsiderSelFNPrecision
54
3210 ,    (1) 
where Precision is management forecast precision, FN is forecast news, InsiderSell is an 
indicator for net insider sales, and InsiderBuy is an indicator for net insider purchases. As 
previously discussed, we expect forecast precision and forecast news to be positively correlated, 
implying that β1 is expected to be positive. To test H1, we interact FN with InsiderSell and 
InsiderBuy, respectively. H1 predicts that β3 is positive and β5 is negative. We use 
firm-clustering adjusted standard errors to account for the possible correlations between 
observations of the same firm, as suggested in Peterson (2009). 
The control variables include a set of variables that likely influence management forecast 
precision. For example, prior research finds that forecast precision (1) decreases with the 
uncertainty that managers face when providing forecasts, which we proxy by forecast error (FE), 
an indicator variable of negative earnings (Loss), forecast horizon (Horizon), return volatility 
(RetVol), and research and development expenditure (R&D); (2) increases with the demand for 
                                                        
12 Because Precision is 0 for point forecasts, we also use Tobit regression to estimate Equation (1) and the other models in the 
paper in an untabulated sensitivity test, and the inferences remain the same. 
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information, which we proxy by analyst coverage (Analyst), institutional ownership (INST), firm 
size (Size), and the market-to-book ratio (M/B); and (3) is lower in the post-Regulation Fair 
Disclosure period (FD) and in industries with high litigation risk (Litigation). We also include 
indicator variables for optimistic management forecasts (Optimism) and annual forecasts (Annual) 
because of their potential impact on forecast precision. In addition, we include the square of 
forecast news to control for potential non-linearity and the interactions between forecast news 
and several control variables (i.e., Litigation, Horizon, and Loss) to control for their potential 
effects on the relation between forecast news and forecast precision. In a sensitivity test, we also 
include the interaction terms between FN and all of the other control variables, and our results on 
insider trading remain the same. Like insider sales, equity issuance can also motivate managers 
to strategically choose forecast precision to increase stock prices and thus proceeds. Accordingly, 
we include an indicator for equity issuance (EquIssue) and its interaction with forecast news. 
Finally, we include past management forecast precision (PPrecision) to control for the impact of 
time-invariant omitted factors. To save space, we relegate the measurement of the control 
variables to Appendix A and the arguments underlying their predictions to Appendix B. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on control variables. The average forecast error is 
0.003; 7.3% of the firms have a loss; the average forecast horizon is 124 days; the average return 
volatility is 0.027; the average R&D expenditure is 5.1% of sales; the average analyst coverage 
is 8.21; the average institutional ownership is 65.1%; the average M/B is 3.64; and the average 
firm size is $9.2 million. About 94% of the forecasts are issued after 2000; 29.8% are issued by 
firms in industries with high litigation risk; 30.5% are optimistic when compared with ex post 
earnings realization; 30% of past forecasts are point forecasts; 1% of the forecasts are followed 
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by equity issuance; and 35.1% are annual forecasts.13 Table 3 provides the correlations for the 
independent variables. None of the correlation coefficients is sufficiently large to constitute a 
multi-collinearity problem.14  
 
4. Main Analyses 
In this section, we first examine the impact of managerial incentives on forecast precision, 
and we then examine how the three conditioning factors affect the relation between managerial 
incentives and forecast precision. 
4.1 Managerial incentives, forecast news, and forecast precision – Results for H1  
Panel A of Table 4 reports the regression results for Equation (1) using the continuous 
variable of forecast news. To facilitate comparison with the findings of Rogers (2008), Column 
(1) reports the results for the base model. As reported in the table, FN has a positive coefficient, 
thus confirming the positive correlation between forecast news and forecast precision. As 
previously discussed, Rogers (2008) uses the change in liquidity as a measure of disclosure 
quality and finds that disclosures before insider sales are of higher quality and those before 
insider purchases are of lower quality. To the extent that more (less) precise forecasts are of 
higher (lower) quality, Rogers’ results imply a positive coefficient on InsiderSell and a negative 
coefficient on InsiderBuy. Consistent with Rogers (2008), we find that the coefficient on 
InsiderSell is significantly positive (p = 0.059), suggesting that management forecasts issued 
before insider sales are more precise. However, the coefficient on InsiderBuy, although negative, 
is insignificant. The difference in results between the two studies may be driven by differences in 
                                                        
13 The descriptive statistics on control variables are similar to those reported in other studies (e.g., Rogers 2008; Rogers et al. 
2009; Yang 2012). 
14 Based on the variance inflation factor (VIF) test, the regressions are not subject to multi-collinearity problem.  
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the samples and the measurement of disclosure quality.15 Overall, our results are consistent with 
Rogers’s (2008) for insider sales, but not for insider purchases.  
Column (2) of Table 4, Panel A reports the test of H1. The coefficient on FN × InsiderSell 
is significantly positive (p = 0.001), suggesting that the positive correlation between forecast 
news and precision is stronger for management forecasts issued before insider sales than for 
those issued at other times. In other words, consistent with H1, prior to insider sales managers 
issue more precise forecasts when the news is more positive to increase the positive price 
reaction, and they issue less precise forecasts when the news is more negative to reduce the price 
drop. 
Also as expected, the coefficient on FN × InsiderBuy is significantly negative (p = 0.001), 
indicating that the positive correlation between forecast news and precision is weaker for 
forecasts issued before insider purchases. In other words, consistent with H1, prior to insider 
purchases managers issue less precise forecasts when the news is more positive to decrease the 
positive price reaction, and they issue more precise forecasts when the news is more negative to 
increase the price drop. 
This analysis highlights the difference between our study and Rogers (2008). Rogers 
focuses on the main effect of insider trading on the quality of management forecasts regardless 
of the nature of the news, whereas our analysis examines how the impact of insider trading on 
management forecast precision varies with forecast news. The positive coefficient on InsiderSell 
indicates that management forecasts issued before insider sales are more precise than those that 
are not followed by insider trading. This finding is consistent with Rogers’. However, we find 
that more positive news is associated with more precise forecasts and more negative news is 
                                                        
15 A closer look at Rogers (2008) indicates that his findings on disclosure quality before insider purchases are relatively weak, 
with the impact of insider purchases on disclosure quality being insignificant in several of his model specifications. 
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associated with less precise forecasts. Similarly, for management forecasts issued before insider 
purchases, the negative coefficient on InsiderBuy is consistent with Rogers’s findings, but we 
find that the more positive the news is, the less precise the forecast is, and the more negative the 
news is, the more precise the forecast is. Put together, the findings of the two studies imply that 
both litigation concerns (as Rogers [2008] argues) and insider trading considerations (as we 
emphasize in this study) are important determinants of management forecast quality in general 
and forecast precision in particular.16 
The results for most of the control variables are consistent with our predictions. For 
example, we find that managers with an uncertain information set are more likely to provide 
vague forecasts and are more likely to provide precise forecasts when the market demand for 
information is higher. Furthermore, managers are more likely to issue vague forecasts when the 
forecast is optimistic, potentially because of litigation concerns, and they are more likely to issue 
precise forecasts when the forecast is an annual forecast. We also find forecast precision to be 
sticky; firms that issued more precise forecasts in the past continue to issue precise forecasts in 
the future. With respect to the interaction terms, we find that the positive association between 
forecast news and precision is stronger in industries with greater litigation risk, weaker for firms 
reporting a loss, and stronger for management forecasts issued before equity issuance.  
Overall, we find the impact of insider trading on forecast precision to vary with forecast 
news. For management forecasts issued before insider sales, the more positive the news, the 
more precise the forecast, and vice versa. Such a strategy can increase the stock price (or reduce 
the blow of bad news) before insider sales. In contrast, for management forecasts issued before 
insider purchases, the more positive the news, the less precise the forecast, and vice versa. This 
                                                        
16 Rogers (2008) also discusses the impact of insider trading incentives. However, he posits that these incentives prompt 
managers to issue low-quality forecasts to maintain their information advantage, regardless of the nature of the news.  
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evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that managers strategically choose forecast precision 
for self-serving purposes. 
Our hypothesis suggests that both the sign and magnitude of forecast news matter in the 
relation between insider trading and forecast precision, and accordingly we use the continuous 
variable of forecast news (FN) in Equation (1) to capture the effects of both. However, it is 
unclear whether the results reported thus far are driven only by the magnitude of a given sign. To 
investigate whether the results hold for the sign of the news and to further highlight the notion 
that the direction of insider trading’s impact on forecast precision depends on the sign of the 
news, we estimate the following regression: 
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020100 , (1') 
where Good is an indicator variable for good news forecasts and Bad is an indicator variable for 
bad news forecasts. Our hypothesis implies that β12 and β23 are positive and that β13 and β22 are 
negative. The research design is similar to Equation (1). 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the regression results. The coefficient on InsiderSell × Good is 
significantly positive, and that on InsiderSell × Bad is significantly negative, thus suggesting that 
good (bad) news forecasts issued before insider sales are more (less) precise than good (bad) 
news forecasts not followed by insider trading. Also in line with our expectations, we find the 
coefficient on InsiderBuy × Good to be significantly negative and that on InsiderBuy × Bad to be 
significantly positive. This result suggests that good (bad) news forecasts issued before insider 
purchases are less (more) precise than good (bad) news forecasts not followed by insider trading. 
That is, the results reported in Table 4, Panel B confirm that the results reported above hold for 
the sign of the news.  
In untabulated analysis, we further separate small good news from large good news and 
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small bad news from large bad news. We find a significant incremental effect for large news, 
indicating that the magnitude of the news is also important. This finding is intuitive. As we argue 
that managers strategically determine forecast precision to increase insider trading gains (to 
increase trading profits or to reduce trading losses), the more extreme the news, the greater the 
potential gain, and thus the stronger the incentive to make a strategic decision concerning 
forecast precision. Given that the continuous variable FN captures both the sign and magnitude 
of forecast news, we use it in the following analyses. Using good news and bad news indicators 
leads to the same inferences.  
4.2 Conditioning analyses 
We use the following regression model to test hypotheses H2-H4: 
H
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323130
222120
10
,  (2) 
where Conditioning_Variable is one of the three conditioning factors used to test hypotheses 
H2-H4. In this regression specification, coefficients E22 and E32 capture the way in which the 
conditioning factor affects the strategic behavior related to insider trading, or more specifically, 
the effect that insider trading has on the association between forecast news and forecast 
precision.   
H2 predicts that managers’ incentive to strategically choose forecast precision is weaker in 
firms with higher institutional ownership. To test H2, we replace the conditioning variable in 
Equation (2) with IH, the decile rank of institutional ownership standardized to [0,1]. H2 implies 
that E22 is negative and E32 is positive. Column (1) of Table 5 reports the regression results. The 
coefficient on FN × InsiderSell × IH is significantly negative (p = 0.004), and that on FN × 
InsiderBuy × IH is significantly positive (p = 0.043), suggesting that managers are less likely to 
  25  
strategically choose forecast precision when institutional ownership is high than when it is low. 
This result is consistent with the argument underlying H2 that institutional investors’ monitoring 
acts as a restraint against managers’ opportunistic behavior in choosing forecast precision.17 
H3 predicts that managers are less likely to use forecast precision for self-serving purposes 
when good news precedes insider sales or when bad news precedes insider purchases. In both 
cases, managers have to balance the potential benefits of an increase in forecast precision with 
the potential increase in disclosure risk arising from more precise forecasts being more likely to 
be proven wrong. We construct an indicator variable, DRISK, which is 1 for these cases and 0 for 
others (i.e., bad news preceding insider sales and good news preceding insider purchases), and 
then interact it with FN × InsiderSell and FN × InsiderBuy. H3 implies that E22 is negative and 
E32 is positive. Column (2) of Table 5 reports the regression results. The coefficient on FN × 
InsiderSell × DRISK is significantly negative (p = 0.001), and that on FN × InsiderBuy × DRISK 
is significantly positive (p = 0.001), suggesting that managers are less likely to choose forecast 
precision strategically when disclosure risk is high than when it is low.  
H4 predicts that managers are more likely to choose forecast precision for self-serving 
purposes when investors have difficulty in assessing the precision of the information that 
managers possess. To investigate this issue, we follow Rogers and Stocken (2005) and construct 
a variable to capture such difficulty. More specifically, we construct a common factor based on 
six variables: the standard deviation of analyst forecasts outstanding when the management 
forecast is released; the standard deviation of analyst forecast errors in the five years prior to the 
management forecast release; an indicator for whether the firm has a loss preceding the forecast; 
                                                        
17 Another commonly used proxy for external monitoring is board independence. We conduct a similar analysis and find some 
evidence that the strategic behavior is less pronounced in firms with high board independence. This relatively weak evidence is 
consistent with the mixed findings in prior research. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find forecast precision to increase with board 
independence, whereas Ajinkya et al. (2005) find no such evidence.  
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the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the year before the forecast date; the average 
bid-ask spread for the 10 days before the forecast date; and the standard deviation of the 
management forecast ranges before the current forecast. We then construct a variable (DIFF), 
which is the decile rank of the difficulty factor standardized to [0,1], and interact it with FN × 
InsiderSell and FN × InsiderBuy. H4 implies that E22 is positive and E32 is negative.18  
Column (3) of Table 5 reports the regression results. The coefficient on FN × InsiderSell × 
DIFF is significantly positive (p = 0.003), and that on FN × InsiderBuy × DIFF is significantly 
negative (p = 0.029). These results indicate that, as H4 predicts, when investors have difficulty in 
assessing the precision of managers’ information, managers are more likely to choose forecast 
precision strategically.  
In Column (4) of Table 5, we include all of the aforementioned interaction terms to test the 
three hypotheses simultaneously. The results are consistent with those previously discussed, 
indicating that the three conditioning variables capture different constructs affecting managers’ 
strategic use of forecast precision to influence market perceptions. 
In sum, we find that managers’ strategic behavior in the choice of forecast precision for 
self-serving purposes is mitigated by institutional investors’ monitoring and the risk concerns 
arising from an increase in the precision of forecasts, but facilitated by investors’ difficulty in 
evaluating the precision of managers’ information.  
 
5. Additional Analyses 
In this section, we first examine whether precise forecasts are associated with stronger 
                                                        
18 We conduct a series of sensitivity tests to ensure that our results are robust to alternative measures of DIFF. For example, we 
use a common factor after dropping any one of the six variables, or a common factor after dropping the two variables with the 
lowest loadings in common factor analysis. The results of these tests are qualitatively similar. 
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market reactions than vague forecasts, as reported in prior research. We then conduct several 
tests to evaluate the robustness of our results.  
5.1 Are more precise forecasts associated with stronger market reactions? 
As discussed in Section 2, one of the key assumptions in our theoretical argument is that 
more precise forecasts are associated with stronger market reactions than less precise forecasts. 
In this section, we examine whether this is indeed the case in our sample. To do so, we estimate 
the following regression: 
HEEE u VariablesδControlPrecisionFNβPrecisionFNRet 3210 ,   (3) 
where Ret is the cumulative stock return from the forecast release date to one day after, minus 
the size-decile-matched CRSP index return in the same period. We expect a positive coefficient 
on forecast news (FN). If more precise forecasts are associated with stronger market reactions, 
then we would expect a positive coefficient on FN × Precision. We also control for a set of 
variables that prior research suggests is likely to affect the association between stock return and 
forecast news (e.g., Baginski et al. 1993; Pownall et al. 1993).  
Table 6 reports the regression results. As expected, the coefficient on FN is significantly 
positive, which suggests that the market reaction increases with management forecast news. 
More importantly, the coefficient on FN × Precision is significantly positive, indicating that the 
market response to management forecasts is stronger when the forecast is more precise. This 
result validates one key assumption used in our hypothesis development. 
5.2 Self-selection of management forecast issuance 
The sample used in the foregoing analyses only includes firms with management forecasts. 
As management forecasts are voluntary, these analyses might be subject to self-selection bias. As 
is common in the literature, we use Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model to control for the 
  28  
potential self-selection bias. In the first stage, we follow Lennox and Park (2006) and Feng et al. 
(2009) in modeling the likelihood of management forecasts. The untabulated results are similar 
to those reported in prior research. For the second stage regression, we add the inverse Mills ratio 
to Equation (1), and obtain results quantitatively similar to those reported in Panel A of Table 4.  
5.3 Use of the actual magnitude of insider trading 
In the foregoing analyses, we follow previous studies (e.g., Rogers 2008) in using dummy 
variables to indicate whether managers buy or sell on their own accounts. The use of dummy 
variables makes it easier to interpret the results and increases the power of the tests because 
doing so imposes no restrictions on the specific form of the relation between insider trading and 
managers’ incentives. At the same time, however, the use of dummy variables neglects the effect 
of the magnitude of trading because the incentive to increase trading gains likely increases with 
the magnitude of trading. In a robustness test, we replicate our main analysis using two 
alternative measures of the magnitude of insider trading. The first is the log transformation of net 
insider sales (or purchases) in dollars, and the second measure adjusts the first for the average of 
insider trading in the previous 12-month period. Managers of some companies may trade more 
than their counterparts in others for such reasons as a difference in stock-based compensation. 
Table 7 reports the regression results. As reported in the table, the inference based on the 
magnitude of insider trading remains the same: the positive association between forecast news 
and precision increases with insider sales and decreases with insider purchases.  
5.4 Bundled management forecasts 
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2011) find that management forecasts are usually issued together 
with earnings announcements, which could result in noise and bias in the calculation of forecast 
news. We use two approaches to address this issue. First, following previous studies (e.g., 
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Waymire 1984), we replicate the analyses after including unexpected earnings as an additional 
control variable if the management forecast is issued around an earnings announcement. Second, 
we follow the method proposed and validated by Rogers and Van Buskirk (2011) to correct the 
measurement bias of management forecast news. This method estimates the unobservable analyst 
expectation at the time of the earnings announcement and then uses it to calculate forecast news. 
The inferences remain the same when we use these two methods (the results are not tabulated).  
5.5 The direction of causality 
In the foregoing analyses, we take insider trading as a given and examine how insider 
trading incentives affect the precision of management forecasts. An alternative interpretation is 
that the precision of management forecasts affects stock prices, which in turn affect insider 
trading. This concern is not as serious in the current study as it is in prior research that uses the 
market reaction to measure forecast news. Nevertheless, following Cheng and Lo’s (2006) 
research design, we adopt a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to address this concern. We 
first predict insider trading and then use the predicted insider trading to capture managerial 
incentives. The untabulated results are similar to those reported.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This study examines whether managers strategically choose the level of forecast precision 
for self-serving purposes. We find that the positive relation between forecast news and forecast 
precision is stronger for management forecasts issued before insider sales and weaker for those 
issued before insider purchases than for other management forecasts. As more precise forecasts 
are associated with stronger market reactions, these results are consistent with our hypothesis 
that managers strategically choose the level of forecast precision to influence the market reaction 
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to their forecasts, thereby increasing their trading gains.  
We also examine three conditioning variables that affect managers’ tendency to manage 
forecast precision. We find that managers are less likely to manage forecast precision when 
institutional ownership is high, presumably because institutional investors can constrain 
managers’ opportunistic behavior through their monitoring. We also find that managers are less 
likely to do so when such a strategy is associated with greater disclosure risk. In contrast, we find 
that managers are more likely to manage forecast precision when investors have difficulty in 
assessing the precision of their information.  
Our study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by examining how managers 
strategically determine forecast precision. Although managers have considerable discretion in 
choosing the characteristics of their forecasts, the research to date sheds little light on how 
managerial incentives affect these characteristics (Hirst et al. 2008). The analyses in this study 
show that managerial incentives can affect forecast precision, thereby furthering our 
understanding of the managerial decision-making process in the issuance of earnings forecasts.  
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Appendix A: Variable Measurement 
 
Panel A: Variables used to test management forecast precision hypotheses  
 
Dependent variables 
Width = Forecast width for a range or point forecast, calculated as the difference between 
the high-end estimate and the low-end estimate, divided by the absolute value of 
the mid-point of the estimate; Width is 0 for a point forecast; 
Precision= Management forecast precision, defined as forecast width (Width) times negative 
1; 
 
Independent variables of interest 
FN = Forecast news, calculated as the difference between management forecast of EPS 
(the point or the mid-point of the range forecast) and the consensus analyst 
forecast of EPS issued in the 90 days before management forecast, scaled by the 
pre-release share price; 
InsiderSell= Insider sale indicator, defined as 1 when the net insider trading (total purchases – 
total sales) in the 30 days after the management forecast is negative, and 0 
otherwise; 
InsiderBuy= Insider purchase indicator, defined as 1 when the net insider trading (total 
purchases – total sales) in the 30 days after the management forecast is positive, 
and 0 otherwise; 
Control variables 
Forecast Error= Management forecast error, calculated as the absolute value of the difference 
between actual EPS and the management forecast of EPS, divided by the 
pre-release share price; 
Loss = Loss indicator of actual EPS, defined as 1 if actual EPS is negative, and 0 
otherwise; 
Forecast Horizon = Management forecast horizon, calculated as the number of calendar days 
between the forecast release date and the corresponding earnings announcement 
date; we use the log transformation in the correlation matrix and regression 
analysis; 
Return Volatility= Return volatility, defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 
250 trading days prior to the management forecast release date; 
R&D= Research and development expenditures divided by sales; 
Analyst Coverage = Analyst coverage, defined as the number of unique analysts who provide 
earnings forecasts in the 90 days before management forecasts; we use the log 
transformation in the correlation matrix and regression analysis; 
INST= Institutional ownership, defined as the percentage of outstanding shares owned 
by institutional investors per 13F in the quarter when management forecast is 
released; 
Size = Firm size, calculated as the firm’s market capitalization (in $million) at the end 
of the quarter before the forecast; we use the log transformation in the 
correlation matrix and regression analysis; 
M/B= Market to book ratio, calculated as the ratio of the market capitalization of equity 
divided by the book value of equity at the end of the quarter before the forecast; 
FD = Indicator variable for post-FD (Regulation Fair Disclosure) period, equal to 1 
when a management forecast is issued after October 2000, and 0 otherwise; 
Litigation = Indicator variable for litigation risk, equal to 1 if firms are within industries with 
high litigation risk (i.e., 4-digit SIC code between 2833 and 2836, 3570 and 
3577, 3600 and 3674, 5200 and 5961, and 7370 and 7374), and 0 otherwise; 
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Optimism = Indicator variable for forecast optimism, 1 if the management forecast (the point 
or the mid-point estimate) is higher than the actual EPS, and 0 otherwise; 
PPrecision = Past management forecast precision, defined as the average precision for all 
management forecasts issued before the current forecast; we use a dummy 
variable to indicate the precision of past management forecasts, equal to 1 for the 
point forecasts, and 0 for the range forecasts; 
Equity Issuance = Indicator variable for the occurrence of equity issuance, equal to 1 if the forecast 
is followed by equity issuance in the next 30 days and 0 otherwise; 
Annual = Indicator variable for forecast of annual earnings, equal to 1 if a forecast is for 
annual earnings and 0 otherwise; 
Conditioning variables 
IH = Decile rank of institutional ownership standardized to [0,1]; IH=0 for firms with 
the lowest decile of institutional ownership and IH=1 for firms with the highest 
decile of institutional ownership; 
DRISK= Indicator for high disclosure risk, 1 if a disclosure of bad news precedes insider 
purchases or a disclosure of good news precedes insider sales, and 0 otherwise; 
DIFF= Decile rank of the difficulty level of assessing the precision of managers’ 
information standardized to [0,1]; DIFF=0 for firms with the lowest decile of 
difficulty level and DIFF=1 for firms with the highest decile of difficulty level; 
the difficulty level is a common factor based on the following six variables: the 
standard deviation of analyst forecasts outstanding when management forecast is 
released, the standard deviation of analyst forecast errors for five years prior to 
the forecast release, whether the firm has a loss preceding the forecast, the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns in the year before the forecast date, the 
average bid-ask spread for the 10 days before the forecast date, and the standard 
deviation of forecast ranges before the current forecast. 
 
Panel B: Additional variables used to test the market reaction to management forecasts 
 
Dependent variables 
Ret= Event period abnormal return for the management forecast, measured as the 
cumulative daily return minus the size-decile-matched market return from the day of 
the forecast to one day after; 
  
Additional control variables 
UE= Earnings surprise, calculated as the difference between actual EPS and the consensus 
analyst forecast of EPS before earnings announcement, scaled by 
pre-earnings-announcement share price; it is set as 0 for management forecasts not 
issued with earnings announcement; 
Multiple= Indicator variable for multiple events, equal to 1 if there is more than one 
announcement (e.g., earnings announcements or other management forecasts), and 0 
otherwise.  
PAccuracy=  Previous management forecast accuracy, defined as the forecast accuracy of 
management forecasts relative to the accuracy of analyst forecasts, averaged over all 
management forecasts issued before the current one. Management forecast accuracy is 
calculated as the absolute value of the difference between actual EPS and management 
forecast, divided by the pre-release share price and then multiplied by minus 1; and 
analyst forecast accuracy is calculated similarly. 
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Appendix B: Description of Control variables 
 
This Appendix discusses the control variables included in the analyses. The detailed 
variable measurement is presented in Appendix A.  
 
First, forecast precision is affected by the uncertainty that managers face when providing 
forecasts. We use several variables to capture managers’ uncertainty including an ex post 
measure, forecast error (FE) (Rogers and Stocken 2005). It is usually more difficult for managers 
to forecast a firm’s earnings precisely when the firm is unprofitable, when the forecast date is 
further away from the earnings announcement date, and when the firm operates in an uncertain 
environment. Thus we include an indicator variable of negative earnings (Loss), forecast horizon 
(Horizon), and two proxies for operating environment uncertainty: return volatility (RetVol) and 
research and development expenditure (R&D). We expect negative coefficients on these five 
variables. 
 
Second, prior research indicates that managers are more likely to provide precise forecasts 
when the demand for information is higher (Baginski and Hassel 1997; Ajinkya et al. 2005; 
Lennox and Park 2006). We use analyst coverage (Analyst), institutional ownership (INST), firm 
size (Size), and growth opportunities (proxied for by the market-to-book ratio, M/B) to capture 
the capital markets’ demand for information. We expect positive coefficients on these variables. 
 
Third, we include several other variables that might affect forecast precision. Regulation 
Fair Disclosure (FD), enacted on October 23, 2000, prohibits selective disclosure and grants all 
investors equal access to a firm’s material information. We expect that managers are more likely 
to release vague forecasts in the post-FD period than in the pre-FD period because the risk of 
voluntary disclosure is higher in the post-FD period due to tighter regulation. We use a dummy 
variable, FD, to indicate management forecasts issued after the year 2000. Litigation risk reduces 
managers’ incentive to issue precise forecasts because precise forecasts are easier to be verified 
subsequently and are thus more likely to be used against companies in lawsuits. We include an 
indicator variable based on industry classification, Litigation, to capture the variation in litigation 
risk. As discussed previously, managers can provide biased forecasts to increase their personal 
gains (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 2005). Thus, we include an indicator for optimistic management 
forecasts (Optimism) to capture any potential impact that forecast bias has on precision, although 
we do not have a signed prediction for this variable. Because our sample includes both quarterly 
and annual forecasts, we include an indicator variable for annual forecasts (Annual) to control for 
the potential difference in forecast precision between annual and quarterly forecasts. 
 
Fourth, we include several interaction terms in the regression. As shown in Choi et al. 
(2010), the relation between forecast precision and news may be nonlinear, and we thus include 
the square of forecast news to control for the potential non-linearity. In addition, some of the 
control variables might affect not only the level of forecast precision, but also the relation 
between forecast news and forecast precision. For example, litigation risk may lead to more bad 
news forecasts and imprecise forecasts (Baginski et al. 2002). Thus, high litigation concern can 
lead to a more positive relation between forecast news and forecast precision. Forecasts with 
longer horizons are more likely to be good news and at the same time less precise, leading to a 
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less positive relation between forecast news and precision. However, if managers have bad news 
with a long horizon, they might issue vague forecasts to dampen the effect of bad news, leading 
to a more positive relation between forecast news and precision. Similarly, firms with losses are 
more likely to issue bad news forecasts, which might be less precise due to the greater 
uncertainty associated with poor performance, leading to a more positive association between 
forecast news and precision. However, one might argue that the good news of loss firms, if any, 
will be even less precise, leading to a less positive association between forecast news and 
precision. Despite the ambiguous predictions for these interaction terms, we include them to 
ensure that our results on insider trading are not driven by omitted correlated variables.  
 
Fifth, managers might strategically choose forecast precision before equity issuance. When 
firms are about to issue additional shares, they have incentives to increase stock prices and 
proceeds. Managers can affect stock prices through voluntary disclosures (e.g., Lang and 
Lundholm 2000). If such incentives also affect managers’ forecast precision decisions, we expect 
managers to issue more precise positive news forecasts and less precise negative news forecasts 
to increase proceeds, as in the case of insider sales. Hence, we include an interaction variable of 
FN × EquIssue, where EquIssue is 1 for management forecasts followed by equity issuance in 
the next 30 days and 0 otherwise. We also include the main effect of equity issuance for the sake 
of completeness. 
 
Finally, despite our efforts, we might still miss important determinants of forecast precision. 
As long as these omitted determinants are not correlated with managerial incentives, our 
inferences are not affected. Nevertheless, we include past management forecast precision 
(PPrecision) to control for the impact of time-invariant omitted factors. 
 
  
  37  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Management Forecasts 
 
This table describes the characteristics of 10,799 management forecasts of current period’s earnings 
issued in the period 1999-2006.  
 
Panel A: Yearly and quarterly distribution of management forecasts  
 
Year Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Total (%) 
1999 45 59 79 84 267 (2.47%) 
2000 58 96 89 171 414 (3.83%) 
2001 181 296 330 357 1,164 (10.78%) 
2002 287 383 380 389 1,439 (13.33%) 
2003 276 360 393 488 1,517 (14.05%) 
2004 340 457 533 530 1,860 (17.22%) 
2005 376 478 505 610 1,969 (18.23%) 
2006 440 573 602 554 2,169 (20.09%) 
Total 2,003 2,702 2,911 3,183 
          
10,799  (100%) 
 (18.55%) (25.02%) (26.96%) (29.47%) (100%)  
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Table 1 (cont’d) 
Panel B: Management forecast news 
 
Good (bad, neutral) news forecasts refer to management forecasts for which the point estimate, or the mid-point of a range forecast, is above (below, similar 
to) the average of the analyst forecasts issued in the 90 days before the management forecast release date. Management forecasts are classified as neutral news 
if the absolute value of forecast news (FN, defined as management forecast minus average analyst forecast scaled by pre-release price) is in the bottom 
quintile of the sample distribution.  
 
  
All management 
forecasts  
Management forecasts 
before insider sales  
Management forecasts 
before insider purchases  
Management forecasts not 
followed by insider trading 
 
 N % 
 
N % 
 
N % 
 
N % 
Good news forecasts  3,555 32.92% 
 
1,163 41.08% 
 
401 28.30% 
 
1,991 30.39% 
Bad news forecasts  5,067 46.92% 
 
877 30.98% 
 
743 52.43% 
 
3,447 52.62% 
Neutral forecasts  2,177 20.16% 
 
791 27.94% 
 
273 19.27% 
 
1,113 16.99% 
 
   
         Total  10,799 100% 
 
2,831 100% 
 
1,417 100% 
 
6,551 100% 
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics on key variables for the sample of 10,799 management earnings forecasts issued in the period 1999-2006. Please see 
Appendix A for variable definitions. 
    Percentile   
   Mean  5%  25%  50%  75%  95%  Std. Dev. 
Forecast Width (Width)  0.117   0  0.018   0.053   0.121   0.462   0.211  
Forecast Precision (Precision)  -0.117   -0.462   -0.121   -0.053   -0.018   0  0.211  
Management Forecast News (FN)  -0.001   -0.011   -0.003   -0.001   0.002   0.006   0.005  
Insider Sell (InsiderSell)  0.262   0  0  0  1  1  0.440  
Insider Buy (InsiderBuy)  0.131   0  0  0  0  1  0.337  
Management Forecast Error (FE)  0.003   0  0.0004   0.001   0.003   0.010   0.005  
Firm Profitability (Loss)  0.073   0  0  0  0  1  0.260  
Management Forecast Horizon (Horizon)  124   33  84  92  122  354  88  
Return Volatility (RetVol)  0.027   0.011   0.018   0.024   0.033   0.056   0.014  
Research and Development Expenditures (R&D)  0.051   0  0  0  0.069   0.243   0.093  
Analyst Following (Analyst)  8.210   3   4   6   11   20   7.630  
Institutional Holding (INST)  0.651   0  0.537   0.705   0.832   0.945   0.245  
Firm Growth (M/B)  3.642   1.075   1.787   2.662   4.146   10.019   3.274  
Firm Size (Size)  9,235   205   693       1,938   6,316  39,083  28,610 
Fair Disclosure (FD)  0.937   0  1  1  1  1  0.243  
Litigation (Litig)  0.298   0  0  0  1  1  0.458  
Management Optimism (Optimism)  0.305   0  0  0  1  1  0.460  
Past Management Forecast Precision (PPrecision)  0.300   0  0.045   0.2   0.484   1  0.305  
Equity Issuance (EquIssue)  0.010   0  0  0  0  0  0.084  
Annual Forecast (Annual)   0.351    0   0   0   1   1   0.477  
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Table 3  
Correlation Matrix 
 
This table reports the correlations among independent variables for the sample of 10,799 management earnings forecasts issued in the period 1999-2006. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. *, ** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
 FN (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
InsiderSell (2) 0.15**                 
InsiderBuy (3) -0.02* -0.23**                
FE (4) -0.09** -0.06** 0.01               
Loss (5) -0.30** -0.06** -0.01 0.30**              
Horizon (6) 0.15** 0.05** 0.05** 0.09** -0.08**             
RetVol (7) -0.21** -0.03** -0.03** 0.11** 0.36** -0.18**            
R&D (8) -0.13** 0.05** -0.04** 0.04** 0.35** -0.10** 0.31**           
Analyst (9) -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.06** -0.01 0.12**          
INST (10) 0.06** 0.09** -0.01 -0.04** -0.09** -0.03** -0.07** -0.03** 0.07**         
M/B (11)  0.07** 0.10** -0.01 -0.13* -0.05** -0.01 0.05** 0.14** 0.06** -0.03**        
Size (12) 0.17** 0.03** 0.03** -0.18** -0.21** 0.06** -0.36** -0.05** 0.34** 0.03** 0.27**       
FD (13) 0.08** 0.06** -0.04** 0.02* 0.01 0.06** -0.16** 0.01 0.01 0.10** -0.11** -0.04**      
Litigation (14) -0.05** 0.07** -0.03** 0.02* 0.14** -0.09** 0.35** 0.51** 0.12** -0.01 0.13** -0.01 -0.01     
Optimism  (15) 0.01 -0.09** 0.05** 0.20** 0.10** 0.17** 0.03** -0.05** 0.01 -0.06** -0.05** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04**    
PPrecision (16) -0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.04** 0.03** -0.07** 0.20** 0.10** 0.08** 0.01 0.15** 0.17** -0.35** 0.08** -0.01   
EquIssue (17) 0.03** 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 -0.02* -0.02** -0.01  
Annual (18) 0.17** 0.00 0.04** -0.03** -0.12** 0.42** -0.27** -0.17** -0.08** -0.22** -0.01 0.10** 0.04** -0.15** 0.16** -0.09** -0.02* 
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Table 4  
Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision: Tests of H1 
 
This table reports regression analysis of the impact of insider trading on the relation between forecast 
news and forecast precision. Panel A is based on the continuous variable of forecast news and Panel B 
is based on the sign of forecast news. The regressions are estimated based on 10,799 management 
forecasts issued in the period 1999-2006. Please see Appendix A for variable measurements. P-values 
are based on one-sided tests for coefficients with predicted signs and are based on two-sided tests for 
other coefficients. We use firm-clustering adjusted standard errors to calculate p-values. 
 
Panel A: Regressions based on continuous variable of forecast news 
This table reports regression results from the following model: 
HEE
EEEE
u
u 
VariablesControlδInsiderBuyFNInsiderBuy
lInsiderSelFNlInsiderSelFNPrecision
54
3210      (1) 
   Model (1)  Model (2) 
Variable 
Pred.  
sign  Coeff. P-Value  Coeff. P-Value 
Intercept ?  -0.261 0.001  -0.264 0.001 
FN +  4.748 0.001  4.003 0.001 
InsiderSell +  0.008 0.059  0.009 0.027 
FN × InsiderSell +     7.866 0.001 
InsiderBuy -  -0.002 0.371  -0.011 0.037 
FN × InsiderBuy -     -5.316 0.001 
Forecast Error -  -1.508 0.071  -1.512 0.067 
Loss -  -0.117 0.001  -0.117 0.001 
Forecast Horizon -  -0.001 0.001  -0.001 0.001 
Return Volatility -  -1.198 0.001  -1.217 0.001 
R&D -  -0.188 0.001  -0.184 0.001 
Analyst Coverage +  -0.006 0.954  -0.006 0.975 
INST +  0.060 0.001  0.059 0.001 
M/B +  0.002 0.008  0.002 0.007 
Size +  0.017 0.001  0.018 0.001 
FD -  -0.010 0.102  -0.008 0.141 
Litigation -  -0.008 0.159  -0.008 0.132 
Optimism ?  -0.012 0.011  -0.012 0.011 
Previous Precision +  0.102 0.001  0.102 0.001 
Equity Issuance ?  -0.094 0.053  -0.095 0.049 
Annual ?  0.086 0.001  0.085 0.001 
FN × FN -  -33.417 0.236  -77.166 0.056 
FN × Litigation +  3.442 0.014  3.474 0.011 
FN × Forecast Horizon ?  0.991 0.280  1.141 0.211 
FN × Loss ?  -8.551 0.001  -8.894 0.001 
FN × Equity Issuance +  17.864 0.047  18.643 0.038 
Adjusted R2   21.07%   21.87%  
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Table 4 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Regressions based on the sign of forecast news 
This table reports regression results from the following model: 
HEEE
EEE
EEE
uu
uu
 
VariablesControlδBadInsiderBuyGoodInsiderBuyInsiderBuy
BadlInsiderSelGoodlInsiderSellInsiderSel
BadGoodPrecision
232221
131211
020100  (1') 
Good is an indicator variable that is 1 for management forecasts that are classified as good news and 
Bad is an indicator variable that is 1 for management forecasts that are classified as bad news. Other 
management forecasts are neutral forecasts. Good (bad, neutral) news forecasts refer to management 
forecasts for which the point estimate, or the mid-point of a range forecast, is above (below, similar to) 
the average of the analyst forecasts issued in the 90 days before the management forecast release date. 
Management forecasts are classified as neutral news if the absolute value of forecast news (FN, 
defined as management forecast minus average analyst forecast scaled by pre-release price) is in the 
bottom quintile of the sample distribution.  
Variable Pred. sign  Coeff. P-Value 
Intercept ?  -0.217 0.001 
Good +   -0.008 0.878 
Bad -   -0.058 0.001 
InsiderSell +  0.005 0.107 
InsiderSell × Good +   0.015 0.005 
InsiderSell × Bad -   -0.023 0.035 
InsiderBuy -  -0.003 0.270 
InsiderBuy × Good -   -0.034 0.005 
InsiderBuy × Bad +   0.021 0.011 
Forecast Error -  -1.360 0.079 
Loss -  0.009 0.568 
Forecast Horizon -  -0.001 0.001 
Return Volatility -  -1.223 0.001 
R&D -  -0.179 0.001 
Analyst Coverage +  -0.003 0.841 
INST +  0.057 0.001 
M/B +  0.001 0.071 
Size +  0.015 0.001 
FD -  -0.005 0.246 
Litigation -  0.018 0.995 
Optimism ?  -0.004 0.327 
Previous Precision +   0.094 0.001 
Equity Issuance ?   -0.092 0.344 
Annual ?   0.087 0.001 
Good × Litigation +  -0.012 0.930 
Bad × Litigation -  -0.064 0.001 
Good × Forecast Horizon ?  -0.015 0.008 
Bad × Forecast Horizon ?  -0.010 0.166 
Good × Loss ?  -0.132 0.047 
Bad × Loss ?  -0.079 0.141 
Good × Equity Issuance +   0.095 0.175 
Bad × Equity Issuance -   -0.170 0.146 
Adjusted R2    22.72%  
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Table 5  
Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision, Conditioning Analyses: Test of H2-H4 
 
This table reports regression results from the following model: 
HEEE
EEE
EE
uuu
uuu
 


VariablesControlδVariablengConditioniInsiderBuyFNInsiderBuyFNInsideBuy
VariablengConditionilInsiderSelFNlInsiderSelFNlInsiderSel
FNPrecision
323130
222120
10
      (2) 
Conditioning_Variable is one of the three conditioning variables: IH, DRISK, and DIFF. IH is the decile rank of institutional ownership standardized to [0,1] 
(with IH=0 for firms with the lowest decile of institutional ownership and IH=1 for firms with the highest decile of institutional ownership). DRISK is an 
indicator variable for high disclosure risk and it equals 1 if the forecast before insider purchases is bad news or if the forecast before insider sales is good 
news, and 0 otherwise. DIFF is the decile rank of the difficulty level of assessing the precision of managers’ information standardized to [0,1] (with DIFF=0 
for firms with the lowest decile of difficulty level and DIFF=1 for firms with the highest decile of difficulty level). Please see Appendix A for variable 
measurements. The regression is estimated based on 10,799 management forecasts issued in the period 1999-2006. P-values are based on one-sided tests for 
coefficients with predicted signs and are based on two-sided tests for other coefficients. We use firm-clustering adjusted standard errors to calculate p-values. 
 Pred.  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
 sign  Coeff. P-Value  Coeff. P-Value  Coeff. P-Value  Coeff. P-Value 
Intercept ?  -0.264  0.001    -0.260  0.001    -0.245  0.001    -0.244  0.001  
FN +  4.058  0.001    5.277  0.001    3.868  0.001    5.003  0.001  
InsiderSell +  0.010  0.014    0.042  0.001    0.009  0.027    0.038  0.001  
FN × InsiderSell  +  12.855  0.001    18.158  0.001    2.046  0.144    18.991  0.001  
FN × InsiderSell×IH -  -9.992  0.004                -7.986  0.011  
FN × InsiderSell×DRISK -        -23.944  0.001          -22.315  0.001  
FN × InsiderSell×DIFF +              9.064  0.003    3.225  0.124  
InsiderBuy -  -0.012  0.032    0.018  0.990    -0.012  0.024    0.017  0.981  
FN × InsiderBuy  -  -6.951  0.001    -17.977  0.001    -2.204  0.070    -16.698  0.001  
FN × InsiderBuy×IH +  4.039  0.043                4.315  0.048  
FN × InsiderBuy×DRISK +        16.774  0.001          18.459  0.001  
FN × InsiderBuy×DIFF -              -3.997  0.029    -5.021  0.033  
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Table 5 (Cont’d) 
 
 Pred.  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
 sign  Coeff. P-Value  Coeff. P-Value  Coeff. P-Value  Coeff. P-Value 
DRISK ?        -0.011  0.056          -0.006  0.327  
DIFF ?              -0.042  0.001    -0.039  0.001  
Forecast Error -  -1.524  0.063    -1.275  0.099    -1.366  0.086    -1.153  0.120  
Loss -  -0.119  0.001    -0.114  0.001    -0.118  0.001    -0.115  0.001  
Forecast Horizon -  -0.001  0.001    -0.001  0.001    -0.001  0.001    -0.001  0.001  
Return Volatility -  -1.225  0.001    -1.133  0.001    -0.358  0.165    -0.341  0.174  
R&D -  -0.185  0.001    -0.191  0.001    -0.190  0.001    -0.198  0.001  
Analyst Coverage +  -0.006  0.971    -0.005  0.923    -0.006  0.965    -0.004  0.913  
INST +  0.060  0.001    0.058  0.001    0.059  0.001    0.060  0.001  
M/B +  0.002  0.007    0.002  0.026    0.002  0.012    0.001  0.033  
Size +  0.017  0.001    0.017  0.001    0.016  0.001    0.015  0.001  
FD -  -0.008  0.144    -0.009  0.106    -0.018  0.009    -0.018  0.009  
Litigation -  -0.009  0.125    -0.010  0.094    -0.008  0.131    -0.010  0.096  
Optimism ?  -0.011  0.014    -0.010  0.028    -0.011  0.014    -0.010  0.032  
Previous Precision +  0.102  0.001    0.099  0.001    0.104  0.001    0.102  0.001  
Equity Issuance ?  -0.096  0.024    -0.095  0.049    -0.095  0.048    -0.095  0.048  
Annual ?  0.085  0.001    0.086  0.001    0.092  0.001    0.094  0.001  
FN × FN -  -83.759  0.039    70.508  0.927    -67.709  0.072    66.859  0.921  
FN × Litigation +  3.227  0.016    3.275  0.015    3.730  0.007    3.394  0.011  
FN × Forecast Horizon ?  1.194  0.189    1.275  0.163    1.114  0.218    1.309  0.147  
FN × Loss ?  -9.201  0.001    -8.400  0.001    -9.034  0.001    -8.480  0.001  
FN × Equity Issuance +  18.486  0.041    19.206  0.031    17.815  0.043    18.546  0.035  
Adjusted R2   22.13%     22.81%     22.59%     23.57%  
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Table 6  
Forecast Precision and Market Response to Management Forecasts 
 
This table reports regression results from the following model:  
HEEE u VariablesδControlPrecisionFNβPrecisionFNRet 3210    (3) 
Ret is the event period abnormal return for the management earnings forecast, measured as the 
cumulative daily return minus the size-decile-matched market return from the day of management 
forecast to one day after. The regression is estimated based on 10,799 management forecasts issued in 
the period 1999-2006. Please see Appendix A for variable measurements. We use the decile ranks of 
Precision and control variables (except UE and Multiple) and standardize the ranks to the range of 
[0,1]. P-values are based on one-sided tests for coefficients with predicted signs and are based on 
two-sided tests for other coefficients. We use firm-clustering adjusted standard errors to calculate 
p-values. 
 
Variable Pred. sign Coeff. P-Value 
Intercept ? -0.004 0.286  
FN + 5.126 0.001  
Precision ? 0.011 0.001  
FN × Precision + 0.412 0.046  
Size ? -0.007 0.023  
FN × Size - -1.254 0.001  
M/B ? -0.010 0.001  
FN × M/B + 0.537 0.002  
RetVol ? -0.003 0.292  
FN × RetVol + 0.008 0.484  
Multiple ? 0.008 0.001  
FN × Multiple - -0.323 0.002  
PAccuracy ? -0.002 0.433  
FN ×PAccuracy + -0.125 0.767  
Annual ? 0.009 0.001  
FN × Annual - -4.455 0.001  
UE + 0.225 0.100  
UE × Size - -0.563 0.028  
UE × M/B + 0.557 0.041  
    
Adjusted R2  11.41%  
 
  
  46  
Table 7  
Using Actual Magnitude of Insider Trading 
 
This table reports regression analysis of the impact of insider trading on the relation between forecast 
news and forecast precision, using actual magnitude of insider trading (instead of indicators). In 
model (1) we measure InsiderSell (InsiderBuy) using log transformation of actual net insider sales (or 
purchases) in dollars and it is zero for observations with net insider purchases (sales); we measure 
insider trading in the period of 30 days after the management forecast date. In model (2) we further 
adjust InsiderSell (InsiderBuy) by deducting the average of net insider sales (purchases) in the 
previous 12-month period. The regressions are estimated based on 10,799 management forecasts 
issued in the period 1999-2006. Please see Appendix A for variable measurements. P-values are based 
on one-sided tests for coefficients with predicted signs and are based on two-sided tests for other 
coefficients. We use firm-clustering adjusted standard errors to calculate p-values.   
 
  
  
Model (1) 
 
Model (2) 
Variable 
Pred. 
sign 
 
Coeff. P-Value 
 
Coeff. P-Value 
Intercept ? 
 
-0.264 0.001 
 
-0.264 0.001 
FN + 
 
4.143 0.001 
 
4.566 0.001 
InsiderSell + 
 
0.001 0.005 
 
0.001 0.031 
FN × InsiderSell + 
 
0.516 0.001 
 
0.391 0.003 
InsiderBuy - 
 
-0.001 0.060 
 
-0.001 0.051 
FN × InsiderBuy - 
 
-0.460 0.001 
 
-0.453 0.001 
Forecast Error - 
 
-1.484 0.071 
 
-1.494 0.071 
Loss - 
 
-0.117 0.001 
 
-0.118 0.001 
Forecast Horizon - 
 
-0.001 0.001 
 
-0.001 0.001 
Return Volatility - 
 
-1.215 0.001 
 
-1.206 0.001 
R&D - 
 
-0.184 0.001 
 
-0.184 0.001 
Analyst Coverage + 
 
-0.006 0.974 
 
-0.006 0.969 
INST + 
 
0.059 0.001 
 
0.060 0.001 
M/B + 
 
0.002 0.008 
 
0.002 0.007 
Size + 
 
0.017 0.001 
 
0.017 0.001 
FD - 
 
-0.008 0.135 
 
-0.009 0.131 
Litigation - 
 
-0.009 0.124 
 
-0.008 0.140 
Optimism ? 
 
-0.011 0.013 
 
-0.012 0.012 
Previous Precision + 
 
0.102 0.001 
 
0.102 0.001 
Equity Issuance ? 
 
-0.096 0.048 
 
-0.095 0.049 
Annual ? 
 
0.085 0.001 
 
0.085 0.001 
FN ×FN - 
 
-73.479 0.058 
 
-61.846 0.095 
FN × Litigation + 
 
3.413 0.012 
 
3.577 0.011 
FN × Forecast Horizon ? 
 
1.171 0.201 
 
1.219 0.188 
FN × Loss ? 
 
-8.811 0.001 
 
-8.912 0.001 
FN × Equity Issuance + 
 
18.630 0.075 
 
18.596 0.077 
Adjusted R2 
  
21.77% 
  
21.51% 
  
